Illustration: Liu Rui/GT

A neologism called "the Chinese Century" suggests China might dominate the 21st century as the British did the 19th or the Americans the 20th. However, in contrast to the UK and the US whose supremacy was based on a unipolar power structure of the world, China may not have the chance to title this century with its name. In the rest 85 years, the world will have more chance to witness a Sino-American bipolar system rather than a unipolar configuration with China's absolute dominance.

Even though China could accomplish the goal of establishing a "prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern socialist country" by 2050, it doesn't mean the US will resign from its position as a superpower.

The global configuration is shaped by power structure of major countries as well as their strategic relations. Although growing stronger, China's comprehensive power has developed in an imbalanced way.

Its economic strength might bring with it international clout, but its political and cultural influence is limited in the Western Pacific region. More importantly, its military strength is only effective in surrounding areas.

Asymmetric growth like this makes it very difficult for China to catch up with the US in terms of comprehensive power, especially military strength, because the improvement of China's defense capability is only based on training while the US improves its military through wartime experience.

China's global influence mainly relies on economic strength. China's soft power is way behind that of the US, and even weaker than that of Germany, which not only firmly holds the reins of European affairs, but even wields moral leverage on Japan. China cannot yet compare to this.

When it comes to major power relations, the US also has an advantage over China. Washington has about 60 allies across the globe, but China, due to its non-alignment policy, has only established a "cooperative partnership" with a similar number of countries including the US.

The difficulties for China to catch up with the US in terms of comprehensive power do not mean that China cannot reduce the power disparity with it. The popularity of some assertions last year, such as "China's military modernization is a threat to the US" or "2015 is the first year of the Chinese Century," indicates that the international community has sensed the rapid rise of China's comprehensive power, although China's economic growth is in a downturn.

The reason why China's comprehensive power has risen amid the slowdown of economic growth rate is that China's political strength has been ramped up by political reform including an anti-corruption campaign and a more assertive diplomatic approach. Besides, the military improvements also contribute to the rise of China's comprehensive power.

China has been speeding up its GDP growth. Its economy will maintain vigorous and sustainable growth as long as China sticks to bold reform and opening-up.

Since 1978, the policy of opening-up has dramatically reinforced China's comprehensive power, improving people's insight in the difference between right and wrong, raising the competitiveness of enterprises, and promoting the government's capabilities of innovation and self-correction. Opening-up cannot guarantee the success of China's national rejuvenation, but national rejuvenation can never be achieved without it.

In the next decade, no country other than China will be able to narrow its power gaps with the US. With the other major powers likely to be left behind farther than ever by both of China and the US, these two giants will probably serve as two poles in the coming world order.

Bipolarization of major power relations was unveiled in 2011 when China and Russia launched strong opposition against the West over the Syrian crisis. In 2012, tensions over the Diaoyu Islands became tense, causing China-Russia vs US-Japan antagonism. In 2013, the crisis in Ukraine has strengthened the strategic relationship between China and Russia, and has drawn the US and the EU closer.

Medium- and small-sized countries in the Asia-Pacific region are tending to pick sides in their security strategies. The bipolarization in East Asia is going to expand to the entire Asia Pacific, for instance, with Australia having chosen to continue its alliance with the US, and Brazil having decided to work on a strategic cooperation with China.

However, bipolarization won't necessarily lead to a new cold war. In the 20th century, the Cold War was triggered by the combination of three basic factors: the nuclear strategy of mutual assured destruction between the East and West blocs, ideological conflicts regarded as a fundamental global political contradiction, and proxy wars used as a major means of strategic rivalry. The mutual nuclear deterrence between China and the US helps prevent direct war between them. Ideological conflicts have been replaced by disagreement on what international norms should be established, while proxy wars have been displaced by scientific and technological competition.

As the center of the world is shifting from Europe to East Asia, the unipolar system dominated by the US will evolve toward a bipolar one, international norms based on European values will embrace pluralism, and regional organizations will play more important roles than global institutions.

The author is dean of Tsinghua University's Institute of Modern International Relations. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn