In the recent visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida to China and several Southeast Asian countries, his stop at China didn't yield any positive results. In talking with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, Kishida showed no sign of a change in Japan's stance on the South China Sea issue, which triggered speculation whether he was serious in making a breakthrough in the bilateral relationship. 

After their talks the two ministers didn't even hold a joint press conference. In this sense, Kishida's China trip is nothing but a show staged for Japanese public, since the talks with Wang can be portrayed as a boastful diplomatic achievement by the Shinzo Abe administration.

The true aim of the overseas trip was displayed in Kishida's subsequent tour to four Southeast Asian countries including Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand. Kishida brought the South China Sea issue into his meetings with the leaders of these countries. As Abe wants to make the South China Sea issue one of the topics at the upcoming G7 Summit in Ise-Shima later this month and Laos and Vietnam have been invited to attend the summit, it's crystal clear that Kishida's tour was designed to lobby for support for Japan's proposition over the South China Sea issue.

This reminds people of the US-ASEAN summit at Sunnylands in February. Although it issued a joint declaration, the summit highlighted the divided views between the US and many ASEAN countries over the South China Sea issue. It seems that Japan intends to take over the unfinished business of the US and make G7 summit a microcosm of the Sunnylands meeting.

But noticeably, Japan's influence on ASEAN countries is much smaller than that of the US, and any attempt to solicit a consistent stance of ASEAN countries with Japan over the South China Sea issue is unlikely to succeed.

In fact, Kishida's visit has exposed Japan's shortsightedness and absence of long-term strategy in its Southeast Asian diplomacy. Take his visit to Myanmar. According to Japan's foreign ministry, Kishida aimed at building a trusting relationship with Myanmar's new government, which means almost a start from the very beginning in bilateral relations.

After WWII, Myanmar received a considerable amount of assistance offered by Japan and thus became a pro-Japan country. However, in the 1990s Japan downsized its assistance to Myanmar, following the US and Europe which imposed sanctions against Myanmar's military junta. Japan's investment in the country was also seriously affected.

Since 2012 after Myanmar embarked on its democratic transition and the sanctions on it gradually were lifted, Japan has again expanded assistance to the country and stepped up its efforts to tap the Myanmar market. But it's already too late. Japanese enterprises have lost the golden chance to develop the Myanmar market and been dwarfed by their counterparts from China and Southeast Asian countries that have gained a dominant position in Myanmar market. Although Myanmar became the second-largest recipient of grant aid from Japan in 2013, this was not immediately translated into mutual political trust between the two countries.

Many Southeast Asian countries including Myanmar have accepted economic assistance from Japan after WWII, and thus has a favorable impression of Japan. Japanese enterprises have invested a lot in Southeast Asian countries, but the Japanese government hasn't envisioned a strategy of building Japan's leading role in the region. Despite having joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership negotiations, Japan is far less enthusiastic about this than in promoting the negotiations of US-led trans-Pacific Partnership. Japan also refused to participate in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Tokyo is keener to woo support from Southeast Asian countries over some political affairs than developing long-term strategic cooperation with them.

This will impair Japan's regional clout in the long run. Japanese enterprise's recent failure in its bid to build submarines for Australian Navy shows the bankruptcy of Abe's attempts to ally with Australia. Japan is very likely to suffer similar frustrations in Southeast Asia in future should it continue its shortsighted practices in the region.  

The author is a lecturer at the School of History, Wuhan University. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn