Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was inaugurated as Taiwan's "president" on May 20. Prior to Tsai's inauguration, the US House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee passed a resolution reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the "six assurances" as the cornerstones of US-Taiwan relations. How the relations among the US, the Chinese mainland and Taiwan might develop during Tsai's term is worth exploring.

It should be noted that the passage of the resolution only demonstrates that there are voices in the US calling for stronger support for Taiwan. It does not have the force of law, i.e, is non-binding, nor does it represent the US government's formal stance.

In the annual report to the Congress titled "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2016" issued in April, the Pentagon stated that "the United States opposes any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by either side and does not support Taiwan independence." The last time the Pentagon explicitly stated its opposition to Taiwan independence in the annual report can be dated back to 2007 when then Taiwan's leader Chen Shui-bian unilaterally attempted to push UN membership referendums.

The US maintains a strategic ambiguity in dealing with the cross-Straits ties. On the one hand, it offers "assurances" to Taiwan that it is against the mainland solving the Taiwan question by force; on the other, it opposes Taiwan independence, which will lead to armed conflict across the Straits. Without US support, Taiwan radical forces will not succeed in their attempts for independence.

In the annual report, the Pentagon also discusses the "military threat" from the mainland. Given the advancement of the US pivot to Asia-Pacific strategy and the simmering South China Sea disputes, the "China threat" is merely an excuse for the US to continue arms sales to Taiwan and strengthen its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

The White House has not yet changed its Taiwan policies. In the future, after President Barack Obama ends his term, be his successor Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump, the new president is highly likely to attach more importance to the relationship with the mainland.

Beijing and Washington are highly dependent on each other economically. As China is its largest trading partner, the US will not support Taiwan at the cost of offending the mainland. For the US, economic cooperation with Beijing can alleviate its difficulties in employment, trade, GDP growth and so forth, especially at a time when the global economy is still mired in sluggish growth.

It is important for the Chinese mainland to develop close economic ties with the US as well. Given the above, the two sides will be cautious in handling their bilateral relations, avoiding being dragged into confrontation because of the Taiwan question.

Tsai has reiterated that both Taiwan and the mainland "must collectively cherish and sustain" the accumulated outcomes of over 20 years of negotiations across the Straits since 1992. The worst-case scenario in the cross-Straits relationship is that Tsai breaks her promises of maintaining the status quo.

Noticeably, mainstream society of Taiwan wants a closer economic relationship with the mainland, rather than Taiwan independence.

Economic cooperation honors equality. Recently, the Tsai government has urged US support for Taiwan's Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) bid. The US, at the same time, requires more openness in trade. Tsai earlier suggested that she would consider easing Taiwan's ban on pork import in exchange for trade talks with the US, which has triggered strong protests from Taiwan pig farmers. Tsai may have to pay some political price for closer US-Taiwan economic ties.

The article was compiled by Global Times reporter Liu Jianxi based on an interview with Yang Lixian, deputy secretary-general of the National Society of Taiwan Studies in Beijing. liujianxi@globaltimes.com.cn