Editor's Note:

Afghanistan remains split by war and division, despite billions of dollars the US has poured into supporting the struggling government in Kabul. What factors hinder the Afghan peace process? Richard Olson (Olson), US special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, talked to Chinese journalists about these issues during his recent trip to Beijing.

Question (Q): Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, in an interview with Pakistani media, said the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship is Afghanistan's biggest problem as Pakistan acts as a sanctuary for terrorist groups. What's your take on this?

Olson: Pakistan has a very important role to play in the peace process. Pakistan has taken a number of actions against terrorist groups within its own territory, especially the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and we would encourage Pakistan to take actions against all terrorist groups, including groups that threaten its neighbors.

Ghani has made some real efforts to reach out to Pakistan. Last December, he traveled to the Heart of Asia summit in Islamabad. That was actually the beginning of the quadrilateral process. We would continue to encourage Afghanistan and Pakistan to work together in face of common challenges. 

Q: Under what circumstances could Afghanistan-Pakistan rapprochement be possible?

Olson: Working together on a reconciliation process offers great potentials for improvement of relations. Pakistan has taken very important steps over the past two and a half years to take actions against groups threatening it domestically. Pakistan has made it clear that it does not want its territory to be used by groups against its neighbors. We continue to encourage the Pakistani government to pursue that policy with full vigor.

Q: The Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), which consists of China, the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan, is criticized for failing to push the peace process forward. What obstacles are there?

Olson: I think it has worked very well and has served several useful purposes. It has brought together four countries that have a real stake in creating peace in Afghanistan. We had intense engagement terms of reference and a roadmap. The only challenge and problem is that we called for the Taliban to come and negotiate with the Afghan government and the Taliban declined to do so.

There were two calls for the Taliban to come to the table, after the third and fourth meetings of the QCG. The first one was rejected by the Taliban political commission in Doha and the second one on behalf of then leader Omar Mansoor.

From our perspective, there is great utility in the QCG. It is an established modality for peace and what is absent is the willingness of the Afghan Taliban to come to the table and discuss with the Afghan government.

The QCG agreed that all members would use their leverage and influence to bring the Taliban to the table. From the standpoints of the US, we will continue to be open to any possibilities for advancing the course of Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation. But at the end of the day, it will be up to the Taliban to find their own interests and come to the table.

Leverage and influence is a common policy adopted by the four members of the QCG. We all recognize that different members of the group have levels of leverage and influence with regard to the Taliban. This was the decision taken by the four.

The US has been very clear that we have no preconditions for the reconciliation process. That is also the position of the QCG that talks should begin with the Taliban and the Afghan government without any preconditions.

The Afghan government and the US government have three "end" conditions. We have three conditions that must be met before we could agree to any particular arrangement. The three conditions are that the Taliban would have to break with Al Qaeda and international terrorists, that they would have to cease violence and that they would have to accept the Afghan constitution, including provisions related to minorities and women. 

Q: How possible is it to bring the Taliban back to the table since the US killed its ex-leader Omar Mansoor?

Olson: It has to be recognized first of all the decision was made based on the fact that Mansoor and the Taliban do represent an active threat to the US. The Taliban are attacking US forces and others within Afghanistan. Beyond that, Mansoor twice rejected the peace overtures made by the QCG. In that regard, we believed Mansoor was an obstacle to peace.

Q: It has been reported that Afghan Taliban officials came to Beijing to talk with Chinese officials on Afghanistan's peace process. What do you think of China's role in this process?

Olson: We think it is a very positive thing that China is taking a more active interest in its neighbor and the security in Afghanistan. We welcome China's initiatives to support the Afghan government and security forces in the provision of security to ordinary Afghans.