Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine in late December, making him the first prime minister in seven years to visit the notorious site. After the visit the US Embassy in Tokyo issued a statement of disappointment for "exacerbating tensions with Japan's neighbors."

It is a rare gesture of direct criticism of its main ally by the US and a departure from the silent diplomacy on the Yasukuni issue adopted by the George W. Bush government.

Why did Abe decide to visit the shrine? If protests from China and South Korea were certain to come, why did the US react in an unusual way?

In international relations, provocative policies or actions can serve as costly signals for leaders to credibly communicate their foreign policy interests to other states.

To a domestic audience, Abe's decision to visit the shrine shows his hard-line commitment to a stronger nationalist agenda and sends signals to supporters that he is a politician of conviction. His approval ratings rose after the visit.

To an international audience, such signals can help a power maintain or gain privileges and recognition in international society. But different audiences make the signaling process more complicated at the international level.

The reaction from China and South Korea was predictable as Abe reportedly told aides, "Relations with China and South Korea are at rock bottom. Even if I visit Yasukuni, they won't deteriorate further." In other words, Abe saw nothing to lose in the visit.

The only country that could plausibly dissuade him from the visit was the US, as its reaction has shown. Abe made the visit anyhow as he believes that China's rise and the relative decline of US influence have given him a chance to present a more confident Japan and gain a larger role in the East Asia strategy of the US.

Abe's blind obsession with history will expose the US to the real risk of a potential direct conflict with China when it tries to engage China in a broad range of issues and maintain regional peace.

It is fair to say that China has nothing to lose in its relations with Japan and that in a predictable future the chance for improvement in bilateral relations is slim.

It is also fair to say that a militarily strong Japan will help the US guard against China's rise and a historical revisionist Japan will prevent a united Asia working against US dominance. But a combination of military independence and a revisionist historical view is the worst case for the US.

For the US, Abe is more than a troublemaker. He is also dangerous. Abe's relentless pursuit of revising the pacifist constitution threatens the post-WWII order and the side that would lose most is the US.

At that time, Japan would gain the capacity for strategic independence from the US power. This would undermine the US dominance as a whole as it would lose a major piece in its world leadership.

US President Barack Obama relies on Japan to help seal the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and move forward with plans to relocate US troops in the region, but would never be willing to do that at the cost of weakening US global dominance and the postwar order.

Xie Chao, a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University, and currently a visiting doctoral student at the Department of International Relations, University of Oxford