OPINION / EDITORIAL
'High fence, small yard' approach forces the world to 'de-Americanize': Global Times editorial
Published: Jul 19, 2024 12:55 AM
Illustration: Chen Xia/GT

Illustration: Chen Xia/GT

The US not only closes its doors, but also reaches out to close the "doors" of others. Multiple foreign media outlets reported that the US is considering taking stricter measures to pressure companies from countries such as Japan and the Netherlands, in order to restrict their chip trade with China. After the report, Wall Street's semiconductor index lost more than $500 billion in stock market value on Wednesday in its worst session since 2020. The US continues to escalate its export controls on China, aiming to curb China's momentum in the high-tech field and maintain US leading position in the global technology industry chain. This practice seriously disrupts the global chip supply chain order.

Despite the US government repeatedly claiming that it has no intention of obstructing China's economic development, it continues to escalate barriers to Chinese chips. On October 7, 2022, the US Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) updated the Export Administration Regulations by issuing interim final rule, listing 31 Chinese entities on an "Unverified List." On October 17, 2023, the BIS released the final rules on semiconductor export controls to China. The plan was to halt shipments to China of advanced artificial intelligence chips designed by Nvidia and others and list many Chinese entities on the "entity list." On March 29, 2024, the BIS issued regulations implementing additional export controls, further expanding the scope of electronic products, including laptops and other electronic consumer products.

Through the so-called "chip diplomacy," the US is establishing close semiconductor supply chain cooperation with its allies, attempting to build an international alliance that excludes China in the high-tech industry. However, the global chip industry chain is deeply interconnected, and attempting to artificially create a world without China is just a political fantasy. The US is demanding that allied countries tighten maintenance services for Chinese chip manufacturing equipment, directly impacting key equipment suppliers such as ASML and Tokyo Electronics, as well as US chip companies like Intel, Qualcomm, and Nvidia. The chip industry is a critical link in the global high-tech industry chain, and its stability directly affects the production and innovation of electronic products. The US' suppression of China harms not only the global community but also itself. 

According to the Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International, global sales of total semiconductor manufacturing equipment by original equipment manufacturers are forecast to reach $109 billion in 2024, with China accounting for over 30 percent, becoming the largest market. Nvidia, Intel, and Qualcomm are expected to generate significant annual revenue from the Chinese market. This is also why, despite facing pressure from Washington, Intel's investment in China is growing. This has also prompted American companies to continuously try to persuade the White House to abandon the policy of upgrading chip restrictions on China. Many American chip equipment manufacturers recently expressed in a series of meetings with US officials that the current trade policy is counterproductive, harming the interests of American semiconductor companies, but failing to prevent China's development as the US government had hoped.

The US is trying to restrict Chinese companies from obtaining advanced chip manufacturing equipment and certain key technologies through export controls. Faced with external pressure, Chinese chip companies will inevitably accelerate their independent research and development efforts, thereby promoting the long-term healthy development of the domestic semiconductor industry. The typical manifestation of US "technological bullying" not only prompts China, but also other countries around the world to deeply understand the importance of maintaining a fair order in the field of technology and promoting common development.

The US used to rely on a highly developed capitalist industrial system, waving the flag of free market economy to point a finger at developing countries' industrialization path and integration into the world market. When its own technological hegemony is challenged by diversified development and it is necessary to support the development of the domestic chip industry, the US resorts to the old ways of trade protectionism. This double standard has exposed the hypocrisy of the US to the world, prompting some countries to change their stance on the semiconductor industry issue and seek diversified cooperation with China in the field of technology. Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates once bluntly stated in a media interview that the US' suppression of Chinese companies doesn't benefit American companies, but this will only force Chinese companies to "become fully self-sufficient." China and other countries are exploring new models of cooperation in the field of technology, avoiding unilateral technological blockades, and promoting multilateral technological cooperation and knowledge sharing.

The international community may witness changes in the global technology governance structure, as well as the role positioning of China and the US in the new international order. The US' chip restrictions can be seen as geopolitical actions stemming from a Cold War mentality and group political perspective, while China's efforts in independent innovation reflect the cooperation and development principles under globalization and free trade conditions. The competition surrounding the chip industry is not only a technological competition in scientific research and development, but also a competition between the international open cooperation system that adheres to the laws of technological development and market economy, and the hegemonic thinking that attempts to impose geopolitical confrontation logic on the economic and technological fields.