Illustration: Liu Rui/GT

Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu concluded his five-day state visit to India on Thursday, his first state visit to India since assuming office. Earlier, on October 4, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar traveled to Colombo to meet with Sri Lanka's newly elected president Anura Kumara Dissanayake in an effort to win favor with the new Sri Lankan government.

It is evident that India is adjusting its diplomatic approach and adopting a more flexible stance to counteract unfavorable developments in its relations with neighbors. 
Since 2024, India has faced a series of setbacks in the diplomatic relations with its neighbors, as the long-standing undercurrent of anti-India sentiment in South Asia has simultaneously erupted in the open. After having assumed office, Muizzu swiftly abandoned his predecessor's "India First" policy, made his first foreign visit to China, and firmly demanded that India withdraw its stationed troops from the Maldives within a set time frame. In Bangladesh, political turmoil has created significant obstacles to improving relations between India and the interim government. Meanwhile, in Sri Lanka's late-September elections, the victory of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, a politician from a Marxist party, has further compounded the challenges faced by India in its regional diplomacy. 

India's regional diplomacy is hindered by two major "mental barriers": a "China-centric mind-set" and a "hegemonic attitude" toward South Asia. Blaming China's influence for the failures in India's neighborhood policy has become a common excuse within Indian policymaking circles. Over the past decade, one defining feature of the Narendra Modi administration's diplomacy has been its focus on counter agendas aimed at preventing other countries, especially China, from advancing cooperative initiatives in South Asia rather than considering how to promote India's national interests and the overall welfare of the entire region.

India has been committed to addressing China's economic influence, preventing other South Asian countries from establishing closer ties with China. It has proposed various initiatives and plans, such as the "Neighbors First" policy, the "Act East" policy and the "Connect Central Asia" policy targeting its neighboring countries.

However, it is clear that India's initiatives targeting its neighbors have made little progress, if any. The fundamental reason for this is that New Delhi has barely conceived of a constructive regional cooperation initiative. It has been very active in some cooperation initiatives, such as the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal project, but its main purpose is not to promote regional connectivity or economic integration. Instead, it is more focused on protecting India in the "sphere of influence" at the southern foot of the Himalayas. From the perspective of India's relations with China, it can be very strongly felt that New Delhi spends most of its time obsessing about how to prevent Beijing from achieving its goals, rather than trying to advance its own plans.

In South Asia, India possessed geographical and cultural advantages that should have translated into stronger regional soft power. However, it often misuses these geopolitical advantages, leveraging the dependence of some South Asian countries on it for essential goods, trade and energy supplies to exert pressure. This approach ultimately weakens New Delhi's influence in the region. India's inclination toward economic "coercive diplomacy" with its South Asian neighbors has forced these countries to seek ways to reduce their reliance on New Delhi, turning instead to China for more reliable supply chain networks.

Recent changes in South Asia's situation have prompted the Modi administration to adopt a more conciliatory stance toward its neighbors. However, if India does not fundamentally change its mind-set, it will continue to be viewed as "an unwelcome big brother," making it increasingly difficult to earn the respect of these countries. More directly, New Delhi should not regard the South Asian region as its "sphere of influence." The real challenge India faces is to develop a proactive regional cooperation strategy, rather than rejecting China's initiatives while failing to take any constructive action.

The author is the deputy director of the Center for South Asian Studies at Fudan University. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn