Tens of thousands of German people gather to oppose the continuous shipment of weapons to Ukraine and to protest against the US and Western countries igniting the Russia-Ukraine conflict on October 3, 2024. Photo: IC

Editor's Note: 

February 24 marks the anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has been ongoing for three years. Why has the conflict lasted for such a long time? Is it approaching a turning point now that the US and Russia have come to the negotiating table? How will the conflict evolve under new circumstances? As the three-year anniversary approaches, the Global Times (GT) has collected views from experts in the US and Europe.

In the first interview of the series, Glenn Diesen (Diesen), a Norwegian political scientist and professor at the University of South-Eastern Norway, shared his insights. He believes that the Ukraine crisis is a symptom of the breakdown of the European security architecture. Europe should overcome its Cold War bloc politics and return to the principle of indivisible security, he argues. 

GT: The Russia-Ukraine conflict is nearing its three-year mark. Why has it lasted so long?

Diesen: The war has lasted this long to bleed Russia. On the first day after the conflict started, Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Moscow had contacted him to start negotiations to restore Ukraine's neutrality. In March 2022, Zelensky confirmed that many Western countries wanted a long war so they could exhaust Russia, even if "this means the demise of Ukraine." Yet, soon thereafter, the Turkish and Israeli mediators revealed that the Istanbul peace negotiations had failed after the US and UK pressured Zelensky to withdraw from negotiations, as they wanted a long war to bleed Russia. For the next three years, NATO sent weapons and refused any negotiations and even diplomacy with Russia, as they argued the war would only end once Russia capitulated and pulled out of Ukraine. As Russia considered this an existential threat, it continued to fight. Three years into the conflict, NATO has run out of weapons to send and Ukraine has run out of soldiers. The war in Ukraine is a symptom of the breakdown of the European security architecture. Hopefully, Europe can overcome its Cold War bloc politics and return to the principle of indivisible security.

GT: On Tuesday, after talks between the US and Russia in Saudi Arabia, the two countries agreed on four principles. One is that they agreed to "begin working on a path to ending the conflict." What is your view on the significance of this meeting?

Diesen: We have seen some positive developments, such as the decision to restore diplomatic missions between the US and Russia. There is also a mutual desire to ensure a political solution that permanently resolves the war, as opposed to a temporary cease-fire and only addressing the symptoms of the war. This gives real hope for optimism. The US appears to recognize that the unipolar world order has come to an end, and it can no longer dominate every corner of the planet. Security must therefore be reconceptualized, as the US must take into account the security concerns of other great powers.

GT: US President Donald Trump said that he could soon meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. If this meeting occurs, how do you think it will affect the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

Diesen: It is near certain that this meeting will occur as both the US and Russia want the war to end. A problem, however, is that Ukraine only plays a small role in these negotiations, and Europe has no role.

GT: Some European media outlets claim that the US "peace plan" has left its European allies "in shock." In response to a series of recent US actions, do you think the US peace plan can achieve what it calls a "just and lasting peace"?

Diesen: The key part of any peace agreement must be to restore Ukraine's neutrality. Three years ago, neutrality would have been enough, but after three years of war, more is demanded. However, a cease-fire deal is urgently needed as Ukraine will only lose more men and territory the longer the war continues. Ukraine is now destroyed, and the US is cutting its losses as it seeks to leave Ukraine and take some of its resources on the way out.

Glenn Diesen. Photo: Courtesy of Diesen

GT: Recently, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated China's position on Ukraine at the Munich Security Conference, calling on all stakeholders in the Russia-Ukraine conflict to participate in the peace talks. How do you evaluate China's position and role in the Ukraine crisis?

Diesen: China's contributions to ending the war are important. This is a conflict in Europe, but the risk that this could escalate into a nuclear war suggests that it also affects the world's security. China is also able to accommodate much of the Global South to contribute.

GT: You once commented that "the most appealing and dangerous idealist argument that destroyed Ukraine is that it has the right to join any military alliance it desires." Recently, the NATO secretary general stated that Ukraine was never promised NATO membership. What do you think this statement means for Ukraine?

Diesen: "NATO membership" neglects that placing a hostile military bloc on Russia's borders is a critical issue to Russia as it considers this to be an existential threat. Denying Russia an institutional veto on NATO expansion sounds moral, but it results in Russia having to impose its veto by military force. Had NATO promised not to expand in 2021, then there would not have been a Russia-Ukraine conflict. Pretending that Ukraine was never promised NATO membership is devastating as the war could have been avoided, and now Ukraine will be in a very difficult and exposed position. 

GT: In your book, The Ukraine War & the Eurasian World Order, you pointed out that "the war in Ukraine is a symptom of the collapsing world order." As the conflict enters its fourth year, how do you think the role of the West in the world order has changed?

Diesen: After the Cold War, the US outlined a security strategy based on unipolarity, or global primacy. Traditionally, security depends on mitigating security competition among the great powers, as the failure to respect the security concerns of other great powers will result in escalation. However, security under global primacy for the US does not entail taking into consideration the security concerns of other great powers. Rather it entails the US being so dominant that it does not matter if other countries feel threatened, as there is nothing they can do. The US must now change its security strategy and begin taking into account the security of its adversaries. In this new world, the West will fragment as the Europeans are no longer a partner for collective hegemony.