Illustration: Chen Xia/GT

Recently, Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani visited the Philippines and held talks with Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro. Both sides decided to further deepen defense ties, including expanding defense equipment and technology cooperation. The confrontational strategic mind-set underlying Japan-Philippines defense cooperation exposes both countries' adherence to rigid strategic thinking, which carries significant risks of major strategic misjudgments.

The strategic alignment between Japan and the Philippines is driven by a dual logic: the mutual need of both countries to leverage each other's strengths for their own gain and the behind-the-scenes push from the US. Bilaterally, Japan and the Philippines have found a convergence of interests regarding the South China Sea issue. From an external perspective, Japan-Philippines cooperation cannot develop without the backing of the US. In the last year of the Joe Biden administration, the first US-Japan-Philippines trilateral summit was held, filling a crucial gap in the US "Indo-Pacific Strategy."

With the new US administration, the US-Japan-Philippines trilateral cooperation is facing a significant test. It is evident that the new US government's focus has not yet shifted toward the Asia-Pacific region, and its attention to the South China Sea seems particularly lackluster. This has raised concerns that the US' security commitments are merely "lip service." Japan and the Philippines are likely to experience strategic anxiety, especially in light of the recent situation in Ukraine, where it seemed to have been "abandoned," along with European allies feeling "overstretched." 

With US security commitments appearing increasingly unreliable, the mutual reliance between Japan and the Philippines seems to be tinged with more "self-serving motives." Tokyo aims to enhance its maritime surveillance and "law enforcement" capabilities while seeking to capture a share of the Southeast Asian market for its military industry by assisting in the modernization of the Philippine armed forces. Meanwhile, Manila is looking to boost its confidence in confronting China in the South China Sea with Japan's support, as well as secure additional economic aid and investment from Japan.

Given that Southeast Asia is positioned at the crossroads of the Asia-Pacific, the US is keen to maintain its regional dominance and will not relinquish the South China Sea as a strategic tool to contain China. The Philippines aims to leverage the South China Sea issue to maximize the matter's strategic utility, while Japan seeks to strengthen its partnerships with the US and the Philippines to counterbalance China's influence in the region. The strategic alignment of these three parties continues to sustain momentum for their cooperation. As for how far trilateral cooperation can go, this largely hinges on the attitude and actions of the US. Given their unique geostrategic significance and "loyalty" to the US, Japan and the Philippines may continue to enjoy favor from the Donald Trump administration. However, it remains uncertain whether this favor will translate into tangible investments and military support from the US.

Japan and the Philippines adhere to a paranoid mind-set of geopolitical confrontation and are accustomed to acting as "pawns" for the US to contain China. In the current context, two major risks of strategic misjudgments have been exposed.

First, the two countries' reckless provocation of conflicts and confrontations in the South China Sea not only contradicts the broader trend of peace and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, but also makes it challenging for them to gain recognition and support from other regional nations. 

They may ultimately find themselves in a strategic quagmire, feeling "abandoned" by the US due to an overestimation of the Trump administration's will to intervene in South China Sea issues.

Second, Japan and the Philippines also underestimate China's resolve in safeguarding its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights. This risky and opportunistic approach is likely to backfire on their own security interests.

The author is a distinguished researcher at the Department for Asia-Pacific Studies of the China Institute of International Studies. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn