Illustration: Xia Qing/GT
Lately the not-so-fresh idea of a "European strategic autonomy" has got back in circulation in many EU capitals. This should come as no surprise, given the condescending and even arrogant attitude displayed by the Donald Trump administration toward US' European allies. Politicians and state officials across the European continent can no longer take the transatlantic commonality of values or even the enduring US leadership for granted and they have to start thinking about Europe playing a more independent role in the turbulent and unstable world of today and tomorrow.
What is surprising, however, is that the ongoing discussions about the desired parameters of "strategic autonomy" almost exclusively focus on its military dimension. This emphasis may be understandable, but arguably it is not very practical. Even if all the needed political, legal, administrative and financial decisions were already in place, it would still take many years, if not decades, for Brussels to become a significant global military actor comparable to already established great powers. Furthermore, the likely cost of such an epic rearmament effort by the EU would be exceptionally high, and for many European nations that are currently faced with significant economic and financial challenges, the cost would be prohibitively high.
However, there is another, no less important dimension of "strategic autonomy," which is often overlooked or suppressed in Europe, and where tangible practical results can be achieved much faster and at a much lower cost. That is the vital economic dimensions of "strategic autonomy." These dimensions, above all, include the advancement of critical modern technologies (digital infrastructure, semiconductors, AI, green economy) and diversification of supply chains to limit the current overwhelming EU dependence on US trading partners.
To achieve both goals, the EU would need stronger economic ties with China. The convergence of interests between the two major economic powerhouses on the opposite sides of the vast Eurasian landmass is evident. In many ways, Brussels and Beijing face similar challenges coming from Washington. Both the EU and China have trade surpluses in trading with the US and it is by no accident that the Trump administration intends to put more pressure on Brussels and Beijing to even out trade balances, assuming that they will ultimately have to accept the new rules of the game set for them in the White House.
At the same time, the EU-China trade remains one of the most significant economic partnerships in the modern world, amounting to $762 billion. It is almost comparable with the EU-US trade or China's trade with ASEAN countries and it has a huge potential for further growth. However, after 2022, when the turnover reached a record $847 billion, this trade was essentially stagnating. This is partially because of EU's concerns about China's rising economic and technological might and partially due to Washington pushing hard for Brussels to align more closely with US trade and investment restrictions on China, particularly regarding the high-tech field. Today, the Trump administration apparently tries to have its cake and eat it: to keep the EU as an obedient junior partner in dealing with China, but to treat the EU as a self-serving and uncooperative adversary in US-EU trade matters.
The natural complementarity of Europe and China is not limited to trade or investment only. Brussels and Beijing have common or overlapping positions on many global issues ranging from the energy transition to the principles of AI governance to reforming WTO. On most of these crucial issues, the EU today is much closer to China than it is to the US. Furthermore, Europeans and Chinese largely share the fundamental commitment to the principle of multilateralism that has been explicitly dismissed by Washington.
This is not to say that there are no disagreements, contradictions or even direct conflicts of interest in China-EU relations. Still, in the rapidly changing international environment of today, the EU and China might find closer cooperation with each other instrumental in hedging numerous risks and uncertainties coming from deliberately unilateralist and often unpredictable US policies. It would also be a clear signal for Washington to demonstrate that the latter has no veto power over the rules of the game in the global economic system. Over time, a situational partnership between Brussels and Beijing might evolve into a more comprehensive strategic partnership.
The author is the academic director of the Russian International Affairs Council. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn
