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Recently, "strategic autonomy" has become a central issue in Europe and a focal point of global attention. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has drastically altered Europe's security landscape, exposing significant weaknesses in the European security system. After the new US administration openly "betrayed" Europe, the illusion that Europe's security could rely on the US was shattered, and "strategic autonomy" finally gained the attention of the EU and its member states.

The core of achieving "strategic autonomy" for Europe is to build an independent and strong European security system. France and Germany are particularly focused on this issue. French President Emmanuel Macron publicly declared the goal of providing a nuclear umbrella for Europe, while German chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz has led the push for a fiscal expenditure plan to inject one trillion euros into Germany's infrastructure and defense industries over the next decade, which has been passed by Germany's parliament. Although many European countries have signaled positive intentions toward achieving "strategic autonomy," divisions still exist within Europe regarding the approach to this issue. Notably, differing opinions from Eastern European countries are particularly evident.

For a long time, the differences between Eastern and Western European countries in terms of economy, society, culture and development - particularly the differing values surrounding "European identity" - have often led to disputes over major policy issues. This contradiction is also reflected in the attitudes of Eastern European countries toward the European "strategic autonomy" plan. For example, Poland strongly supports continued aid to Ukraine and the EU's proposed "rearming Europe" plan, and it has announced plans to increase defense spending to 5 percent of its GDP by 2025. In contrast, Hungary has shown indifference to aid for Ukraine and opposed the EU's defense strengthening proposal.

While the UK and France are leading efforts to actively form a "peacekeeping force" for Ukraine, Poland, which shares a border with Ukraine, has stated that it will not send troops. Regarding the nuclear umbrella, Polish President Andrzej Duda publicly called on the US to deploy nuclear weapons to Polish soil, indicating that Poland is not as enthusiastic about Macron's proposal of a nuclear umbrella.

The significant differences and disagreements among Eastern European countries on European security issues can be attributed to two main reasons.

First, the European "strategic autonomy" plan fails to alleviate the longstanding security anxieties of Eastern European countries. Additionally, with the US military presence in Eastern Europe, countries like Poland and Romania rely, to varying degrees, on US security guarantees. With Europe's longstanding state of "military neglect," these countries are clearly more willing to trust the protection offered by the US. Poland's reluctance to deeply engage in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and Hungary's decision to ease relations with Russia are examples of "self-preservation" actions that are directly related to the belief that Europe cannot provide adequate security guarantees.

Second, the interests of Eastern European countries do not completely align with the EU's security plan. When faced with the choice between "building infrastructure" and "ensuring security," Eastern European countries generally prioritize the former. One of Poland's reasons for supporting military buildup is to gain influence and a stronger voice within the EU, rather than a genuine desire to be involved in any conflicts. 

While most Eastern European countries acknowledge the importance and significance of European "strategic autonomy," convincing them to accept the Franco-German-led "strategic autonomy" plan is clearly not an easy task. The most difficult challenge is to help Eastern European countries overcome their path dependency in the security field and regain confidence in Europe's independent defense capabilities. In this context, creating a European defense development plan that aligns with the shared interests of all parties and satisfies everyone will be the main challenge the EU and its member states will face in the future.

The author is a senior research fellow at the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn